Maj Gen Ashok K Mehta (retd)
Military Commentator
With the ground situation in eastern Ladakh escalating despite the India-China Foreign Minister’s five-point agreement in Moscow, many fear that at one of several friction points, a Galwan-like clash could escalate into Nathu La-like skirmish (1967) after the unarmed combat and prophylactic firing thresholds have been crossed. New triggers exist for escalation in the Fingers and Mukhpari areas north and south of Pangong Lake where the Indian Army has pre-emptively occupied dominating heights. Both sides are blaming each other for trespassing LAC and firing. It is possible that a localised incident could spread to other friction points resulting in unintended consequences. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh observed in the Rajya Sabha: “You can start a war. You can’t end it.”
Ever since the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) Gen Bipin Rawat placed the military option on the table in case diplomacy failed, two likely contingencies have resurfaced — evicting PLA intruders and/or executing counter-intrusions across the Chinese LAC. These offensive operations, especially the first, contains the potential for escalating into a broader conflict across Ladakh, but not necessarily confined to it. At present, armed forces from both sides are arrayed astride the LAC in eastern Ladakh, the likely theatre of conflict.
China and Pakistan jointly and vigorously reacted to India’s abrogation of Article 370 in J&K with Islamabad producing a provocative new map and upgrading Gilgit-Baltistan into a province along with Beijing objecting to Home Minister Amit Shah’s parliamentary rhetoric about liberating Aksai Chin. More collusive political, diplomatic and military adventures are in their playbook and could be unleashed during campaigning, though there is no build-up in PoK.
Early in 2009, the then Army Chief Gen Deepak Kapoor enunciated the concept of a two-front war emulating a predecessor, Gen Ved Malik, who had announced ‘limited war under nuclear threshold’ in 2004. Both war-fighting doctrines were in response to terrorist attacks from Pakistan on Indian Parliament in 2001 and in Mumbai (2008).
In February 2009, though there was no direct threat from China, Defence Minister AK Antony issued an operational directive to the Chiefs of Staff, to prepare for a two-front war. Two new units — 56 and 71 Mountain Divisions and later, the 17 Mountain Strike Corps (in the ongoing 13th Defence Plan) — consisting of two mountain divisions and an armoured brigade, were sanctioned.
The Modi government put the strike corps on the back-burner due to paucity of funds. In addition, infrastructure projects for the China front were revamped. At the time, while the two-front strategy envisaged a full-blown war with Pakistan, against China, it was dissuasion, though Beijing was expected to provide Islamabad, as in the past (1965, 1971, and 1971 wars), political, diplomatic and material support. If there was a war with China, Pakistan would capitalise from the opportunity.
On May 8, 2012, Antony told the Rajya Sabha that the “Army’s new proactive strategy had also factored the remote but plausible contingency of grappling with both China and Pakistan simultaneously. We have given a new directive to our armed forces… after an analysis of threat perception, we have found the picture is problematic. I have to ask the government for Rs 46,000 crore more.”
The then Leader of Opposition Arun Jaitley suggested the two-front strategy be ‘defeating Pakistan and containing China’. On becoming the Army Chief, General Rawat reiterated the two-front concept and thereafter, his successor, General Naravane has elaborated — a primary front and a subsidiary front with dedicated forces unlike the dual tasked formations of the past.
Given the inevitable shortfall in equipment inventories due to reduced defence budget at 1.5% of the GDP for the last six years and despite the panic buying of specialised stores to counter the multiple intrusions not foreseen — a Black Swan event — it is essential that India is not faced with two fronts as it cannot realistically fight both fronts. One front has to be neutralised diplomatically and only the US can do it like it did in 1962 when it kept Pakistan on a leash as a quid pro quo for India agreeing to discuss Kashmir under US patronage in the famous Swaran Singh-Bhutto eight-month-long dialogue.
In 2002, the US dissuaded India not once but twice from launching attacks on Pakistan following terrorist attack on Parliament. Similarly, it restrained India from responding militarily to Mumbai and since 2008 has ensured Pakistan does not allow terrorist entities to launch Mumbai-type spectacular attacks. The US has played a critical role in conflict prevention along the India-Pakistan front.
Since Independence, a post-colonial India’s national defence and security strategy has been based on not losing an inch of its territory despite being boxed in by four lines — McMahon, Durand, LoC and LAC. Failure to deter China’s occupation of Tibet was a Himalayan blunder. The defence doctrine was geared to defend territory coupled with parliamentary pledges to recover land lost to Pakistan and China. The Indian Army occupied high-altitude defence in the north against China and constructed anti-tank ditches and canal systems in the plains in the west against Pakistan to meet the external attacks around Maginot Lines. India has failed to read the Chinese tea leaves that it can achieve its political objective of extending the 1959 claim line in Ladakh without employing kinetic force and engaging Indian forces in their strong defences.
Since 1962, India has never planned to fight the Chinese along the LAC ahead of main defences in Ladakh. Not only has China surprised India through multiple intrusions, but also drawn out the Indian Army into the mainly plateau sectors ahead of their traditional strongholds. After Beijing’s success in South China Sea and probably in eastern Ladakh too, the saying that Chinese win without fighting and Americans fight without winning is finding resonance. Clearly, China will not initiate hostilities or fight a 1962. Equally, nor will New Delhi, it knows. Realism dictates neutralising one front diplomatically for restoring India’s self-esteem and status quo ante. Meanwhile, a new military doctrine accentuating punitive pre-emption is needed along the LAC.
"front" - Google News
September 22, 2020 at 08:12AM
https://ift.tt/2ZUkvDV
Two-front plan should factor in diplomacy - The Tribune India
"front" - Google News
https://ift.tt/3aZh1mr
https://ift.tt/3b2xvu5
No comments:
Post a Comment